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100%: by William H. Mcraven (Author): Spec Ops: Case Studies in Special Operations Warfare: Theory and Practice [Paperback] (ISBN: 9780891416005) 1996, in Englisch, Taschenbuch.Nur diese Ausgabe anzeigen…
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Spec Ops: Case Studies in Special Operations Warfare: Theory and Practice [Paperback]
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Spec Ops - Case Studies in Special Operations Warfare: Theory and Practice (2011)
~EN NW EB DLISBN: 9780307547231 bzw. 030754723X, vermutlich in Englisch, Random House Publishing Group, neu, E-Book, elektronischer Download.
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Spec Ops: Vice Adm. William H. McRaven helped to devise the strategy for how to bring down Osama bin Laden, and commanded the courageous U.S. military unit that carried it out on May 1, 2011, ending one of the greatest manhunts in history. In Spec Ops, a well-organized and deeply researched study, McRaven analyzes eight classic special operations. Six are from WWII: the German commando raid on the Belgian fort Eben Emael (1940) the Italian torpedo attack on the Alexandria harbor (1941) the British commando raid on Nazaire, France (1942) the German glider rescue of Benito Mussolini (1943) the British midget-submarine attack on the Tirpitz (1943) and the U.S. Ranger rescue mission at the Cabanatuan POW camp in the Philippines (1945). The two post-WWII examples are the U.S. Army raid on the Son Tay POW camp in North Vietnam (1970) and the Israeli rescue of the skyjacked hostages in Entebbe, Uganda (1976). McRaven-who commands a U.S. Navy SEAL team-pinpoints six essential principles of `spec ops` success: simplicity, security, repetition, surprise, speed and purpose. For each of the case studies, he provides political and military context, a meticulous reconstruction of the mission itself and an analysis of the operation in relation to his six principles. McRaven deems the Son Tay raid `the best modern example of a successful spec op [which] should be considered textbook material for future missions.` His own book is an instructive textbook that will be closely studied by students of the military arts. Maps, photos. Englisch, Ebook.
Spec Ops: Vice Adm. William H. McRaven helped to devise the strategy for how to bring down Osama bin Laden, and commanded the courageous U.S. military unit that carried it out on May 1, 2011, ending one of the greatest manhunts in history. In Spec Ops, a well-organized and deeply researched study, McRaven analyzes eight classic special operations. Six are from WWII: the German commando raid on the Belgian fort Eben Emael (1940) the Italian torpedo attack on the Alexandria harbor (1941) the British commando raid on Nazaire, France (1942) the German glider rescue of Benito Mussolini (1943) the British midget-submarine attack on the Tirpitz (1943) and the U.S. Ranger rescue mission at the Cabanatuan POW camp in the Philippines (1945). The two post-WWII examples are the U.S. Army raid on the Son Tay POW camp in North Vietnam (1970) and the Israeli rescue of the skyjacked hostages in Entebbe, Uganda (1976). McRaven-who commands a U.S. Navy SEAL team-pinpoints six essential principles of `spec ops` success: simplicity, security, repetition, surprise, speed and purpose. For each of the case studies, he provides political and military context, a meticulous reconstruction of the mission itself and an analysis of the operation in relation to his six principles. McRaven deems the Son Tay raid `the best modern example of a successful spec op [which] should be considered textbook material for future missions.` His own book is an instructive textbook that will be closely studied by students of the military arts. Maps, photos. Englisch, Ebook.
2
Spec Ops: Case Studies In Special Operations Warfare: Theory And Practice
EN NWISBN: 9780891416005 bzw. 0891416005, in Englisch, Random House Publishing Group, neu.
Lieferung aus: Kanada, Lagernd, zzgl. Versandkosten.
William H. Mcraven, Books, History, Spec Ops: Case Studies In Special Operations Warfare: Theory And Practice, Vice Adm. William H. McRaven helped to devise the strategy for how to bring down Osama bin Laden, and commanded the courageous U.S. military unit that carried it out on May 1, 2011, ending one of the greatest manhunts in history. In Spec Ops, a well-organized and deeply researched study, McRaven analyzes eight classic special operations. Six are from WWII: the German commando raid on the Belgian fort Eben Emael (1940); the Italian torpedo attack on the Alexandria harbor (1941); the British commando raid on Nazaire, France (1942); the German glider rescue of Benito Mussolini (1943); the British midget-submarine attack on the Tirpitz (1943); and the U.S. Ranger rescue mission at the Cabanatuan POW camp in the Philippines (1945). The two post-WWII examples are the U.S. Army raid on the Son Tay POW camp in North Vietnam (1970) and the Israeli rescue of the skyjacked hostages in Entebbe, Uganda (1976). McRaven—who commands a U.S. Navy SEAL team—pinpoints six essential principles of “spec ops” success: simplicity, security, repetition, surprise, speed and purpose. For each of the case studies, he provides political and military context, a meticulous reconstruction of the mission itself and an analysis of the operation in relation to his six principles. McRaven deems the Son Tay raid “the best modern example of a successful spec op [which] should be considered textbook material for future missions.” His own book is an instructive textbook that will be closely studied by students of the military arts. Maps, photos.
William H. Mcraven, Books, History, Spec Ops: Case Studies In Special Operations Warfare: Theory And Practice, Vice Adm. William H. McRaven helped to devise the strategy for how to bring down Osama bin Laden, and commanded the courageous U.S. military unit that carried it out on May 1, 2011, ending one of the greatest manhunts in history. In Spec Ops, a well-organized and deeply researched study, McRaven analyzes eight classic special operations. Six are from WWII: the German commando raid on the Belgian fort Eben Emael (1940); the Italian torpedo attack on the Alexandria harbor (1941); the British commando raid on Nazaire, France (1942); the German glider rescue of Benito Mussolini (1943); the British midget-submarine attack on the Tirpitz (1943); and the U.S. Ranger rescue mission at the Cabanatuan POW camp in the Philippines (1945). The two post-WWII examples are the U.S. Army raid on the Son Tay POW camp in North Vietnam (1970) and the Israeli rescue of the skyjacked hostages in Entebbe, Uganda (1976). McRaven—who commands a U.S. Navy SEAL team—pinpoints six essential principles of “spec ops” success: simplicity, security, repetition, surprise, speed and purpose. For each of the case studies, he provides political and military context, a meticulous reconstruction of the mission itself and an analysis of the operation in relation to his six principles. McRaven deems the Son Tay raid “the best modern example of a successful spec op [which] should be considered textbook material for future missions.” His own book is an instructive textbook that will be closely studied by students of the military arts. Maps, photos.
3
Spec Ops: Case Studies in Special Operations Warfare: Theory and Practice (1996)
EN PB USISBN: 9780891416005 bzw. 0891416005, in Englisch, 432 Seiten, Presidio Press, Taschenbuch, gebraucht.
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Von Händler/Antiquariat, Gramma Betty's Books.
Vice Adm. William H. McRaven helped to devise the strategy for how to bring down Osama bin Laden, and commanded the courageous U.S. military unit that carried it out on May 1, 2011, ending one of the greatest manhunts in history. In Spec Ops, a well-organized and deeply researched study, McRaven analyzes eight classic special operations. Six are from WWII: the German commando raid on the Belgian fort Eben Emael (1940); the Italian torpedo attack on the Alexandria harbor (1941); the British commando raid on Nazaire, France (1942); the German glider rescue of Benito Mussolini (1943); the British midget-submarine attack on the Tirpitz (1943); and the U.S. Ranger rescue mission at the Cabanatuan POW camp in the Philippines (1945). The two post-WWII examples are the U.S. Army raid on the Son Tay POW camp in North Vietnam (1970) and the Israeli rescue of the skyjacked hostages in Entebbe, Uganda (1976). McRaven—who commands a U.S. Navy SEAL team—pinpoints six essential principles of “spec ops” success: simplicity, security, repetition, surprise, speed and purpose. For each of the case studies, he provides political and military context, a meticulous reconstruction of the mission itself and an analysis of the operation in relation to his six principles. McRaven deems the Son Tay raid “the best modern example of a successful spec op [which] should be considered textbook material for future missions.” His own book is an instructive textbook that will be closely studied by students of the military arts. Maps, photos. Paperback, Edition: unknown, Label: Presidio Press, Presidio Press, Product group: Book, Published: 1996-06-01, Release date: 1996-06-01, Studio: Presidio Press, Sales rank: 104779.
Von Händler/Antiquariat, Gramma Betty's Books.
Vice Adm. William H. McRaven helped to devise the strategy for how to bring down Osama bin Laden, and commanded the courageous U.S. military unit that carried it out on May 1, 2011, ending one of the greatest manhunts in history. In Spec Ops, a well-organized and deeply researched study, McRaven analyzes eight classic special operations. Six are from WWII: the German commando raid on the Belgian fort Eben Emael (1940); the Italian torpedo attack on the Alexandria harbor (1941); the British commando raid on Nazaire, France (1942); the German glider rescue of Benito Mussolini (1943); the British midget-submarine attack on the Tirpitz (1943); and the U.S. Ranger rescue mission at the Cabanatuan POW camp in the Philippines (1945). The two post-WWII examples are the U.S. Army raid on the Son Tay POW camp in North Vietnam (1970) and the Israeli rescue of the skyjacked hostages in Entebbe, Uganda (1976). McRaven—who commands a U.S. Navy SEAL team—pinpoints six essential principles of “spec ops” success: simplicity, security, repetition, surprise, speed and purpose. For each of the case studies, he provides political and military context, a meticulous reconstruction of the mission itself and an analysis of the operation in relation to his six principles. McRaven deems the Son Tay raid “the best modern example of a successful spec op [which] should be considered textbook material for future missions.” His own book is an instructive textbook that will be closely studied by students of the military arts. Maps, photos. Paperback, Edition: unknown, Label: Presidio Press, Presidio Press, Product group: Book, Published: 1996-06-01, Release date: 1996-06-01, Studio: Presidio Press, Sales rank: 104779.
4
Spec Ops: Case Studies in Special Operations Warfare: Theory and Practice
EN USISBN: 0891416005 bzw. 9780891416005, in Englisch, Presidio Press, gebraucht.
Lieferung aus: Vereinigte Staaten von Amerika, Lagernd.
americas,engineering,history,military,military science,strategy,technology, Vice Adm. William H. McRaven helped to devise the strategy for how to bring down Osama bin Laden, and commanded the courageous U.S. military unit that carried it out on May 1, 2011, ending one of the greatest manhunts in history. In Spec Ops, a well-organized and deeply researched study, McRaven analyzes eight classic special operations. Six are from WWII: the German commando raid on the Belgian fort Eben Emael (1940); the Italian torpedo attack on the Alexandria harbor (1941); the British commando raid on Nazaire, France (1942); the German glider rescue of Benito Mussolini (1943); the British midget-submarine attack on the Tirpitz (1943); and the U.S. Ranger rescue mission at the Cabanatuan POW camp in the Philippines (1945). The two post-WWII examples are the U.S. Army raid on the Son Tay POW camp in North Vietnam (1970) and the Israeli rescue of the skyjacked hostages in Entebbe, Uganda (1976). McRaven-who commands a U.S. Navy SEAL team-pinpoints six essential principles of "spec ops" success: simplicity, security, repetition, surprise, speed and purpose. For each of the case studies, he provides political and military context, a meticulous reconstruction of the mission itself and an analysis of the operation in relation to his six principles. McRaven deems the Son Tay raid "the best modern example of a successful spec op [which] should be considered textbook material for future missions." His own book is an instructive textbook that will be closely studied by stude.
americas,engineering,history,military,military science,strategy,technology, Vice Adm. William H. McRaven helped to devise the strategy for how to bring down Osama bin Laden, and commanded the courageous U.S. military unit that carried it out on May 1, 2011, ending one of the greatest manhunts in history. In Spec Ops, a well-organized and deeply researched study, McRaven analyzes eight classic special operations. Six are from WWII: the German commando raid on the Belgian fort Eben Emael (1940); the Italian torpedo attack on the Alexandria harbor (1941); the British commando raid on Nazaire, France (1942); the German glider rescue of Benito Mussolini (1943); the British midget-submarine attack on the Tirpitz (1943); and the U.S. Ranger rescue mission at the Cabanatuan POW camp in the Philippines (1945). The two post-WWII examples are the U.S. Army raid on the Son Tay POW camp in North Vietnam (1970) and the Israeli rescue of the skyjacked hostages in Entebbe, Uganda (1976). McRaven-who commands a U.S. Navy SEAL team-pinpoints six essential principles of "spec ops" success: simplicity, security, repetition, surprise, speed and purpose. For each of the case studies, he provides political and military context, a meticulous reconstruction of the mission itself and an analysis of the operation in relation to his six principles. McRaven deems the Son Tay raid "the best modern example of a successful spec op [which] should be considered textbook material for future missions." His own book is an instructive textbook that will be closely studied by stude.
5
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Spec Ops: Case Studies in Special Operations Warfare: Theory and Practice (1996)
~EN PB US RPISBN: 9780891416005 bzw. 0891416005, vermutlich in Englisch, Presidio Press, Taschenbuch, gebraucht, guter Zustand, Nachdruck.
Lieferung aus: Neuseeland, Versandkosten nach: CHE.
Von Händler/Antiquariat, bookexpress.co.nz.
Presidio Press. Very Good. 5.99(w) x 8.95(h) x 0.90(d). Paperback. 1996. 432 pages. Vice Adm. William H. McRaven helped to devise the strategy for how to bring down Osama bin Laden, and commanded the courageous U.S. military unit that carried it out on May 1, 2011 , ending one of the greatest manhunts in history. In Spec Ops, a well-organized and deeply researched study, McRaven analyzes eigh t classic special operations. Six are from WWII: the German comma ndo raid on the Belgian fort Eben Emael (1940); the Italian torpe do attack on the Alexandria harbor (1941); the British commando r aid on Nazaire, France (1942); the German glider rescue of Benito Mussolini (1943); the British midget-submarine attack on the Tir pitz (1943); and the U.S. Ranger rescue mission at the Cabanatuan POW camp in the Philippines (1945). The two post-WWII examples a re the U.S. Army raid on the Son Tay POW camp in North Vietnam (1 970) and the Israeli rescue of the skyjacked hostages in Entebbe, Uganda (1976). McRaven--who commands a U.S. Navy SEAL team--pinp oints six essential principles of spec ops success: simplicity, s ecurity, repetition, surprise, speed and purpose. For each of the case studies, he provides political and military context, a meti culous reconstruction of the mission itself and an analysis of th e operation in relation to his six principles. McRaven deems the Son Tay raid the best modern example of a successful spec op [whi ch] should be considered textbook material for future missions. H is own book is an instructive textbook that will be closely studi ed by students of the military arts. Maps, photos. Editorial Rev iews About the Author Admiral William H. McRaven (U.S. Navy Reti red) served with great distinction in the Navy. In his thirty-sev en years as a Navy SEAL, he commanded at every level. As a Four-S tar Admiral, his final assignment was as Commander of all U.S. Sp ecial Operations Forces. He is now Chancellor of the University o f Texas System. Excerpt. Reprinted by permission. All rights re served. Theory of Special Operations In the realm of military li terature, there is much written on theory of war, ranging from He rman Kahn's thinking about the unthinkable on the nuclear end of the spectrum to B. H. Liddell Hart's indirect warfare on the conv entional end. There are theories of war escalation and war termin ation, theories of revolution and counterrevolution, and theories of insurgency and counterinsurgency. There are general airpower and sea power theories, and more specific theories on strategic b ombing and amphibious warfare. Nowhere, however, is there a theor y of special operations. Why is a theory of special operations i mportant? A successful special operation defies conventional wisd om by using a small force to defeat a much larger or well-entrenc hed opponent. This book develops a theory of special operations t hat explains why this phenomenon occurs. I will show that through the use of certain principles of warfare a special operations fo rce can reduce what Carl von Clausewitz calls the frictions of wa r to a manageable level. By minimizing these frictions the specia l operations force can achieve relative superiority over the enem y. Once relative superiority is achieved, the attacking force is no longer at a disadvantage and has the initiative to exploit the enemy's weaknesses and secure victory. Although gaining relative superiority doesn't guarantee success, it is necessary for succe ss. If we can determine, prior to an operation, the best way to a chieve relative superiority, then we can tailor special operation s planning and preparation to improve our chances of victory. Thi s theory will not make the reader a better diver, flyer, or jumpe r, but it will provide an intellectual framework for thinking abo ut special operations. The relative superiority graph that will b e shown later is a tool to assess the viability of a proposed spe cial operation. THE SCOPE OF THIS STUDY To develop a theory of special operations I had to first limit the scope of the problem. This required developing the following refined definition of a s pecial operation: A special operation is conducted by forces spec ially trained, equipped, and supported for a specific target whos e destruction, elimination, or rescue (in the case of hostages), is a political or military imperative.* My definition is not con sistent with official joint doctrine which broadly defines specia l operations to include psychological operations, civil affairs, and reconnaissance. The eight combat operations I analyzed to det ermine the principles of special operations and to develop the th eory are more closely aligned to what Joint Pub 3-05 defines as a direct-action mission.†Unlike direct-action missions, however, the eight special operations that I analyze in this book were alw ays of a strategic or operational nature and had the advantage of virtually unlimited resources and national-level intelligence. T he refined definition also implies that special operations can be conducted by non-special operations personnel, such as those air men who conducted James Doolittle's raid on Tokyo or the submarin ers involved in the raid on the German battleship Tirpitz. Althou gh I believe the theory of special operations, as presented in th is book, is applicable across the spectrum of special operations, as defined by Joint Pub 3-05, it was developed solely from the e ight case studies presented in this work. All usage of the term s pecial operations henceforth will adhere to this refined definiti on. WHY ARE SPECIAL OPERATIONS UNIQUE? All special operations a re conducted against fortified positions, whether a particular po sition is a battleship surrounded by anti-torpedo nets (the Briti sh midget submarine raid on the German battleship Tirpitz), a mou ntain retreat guarded by Italian troops (Otto Skorzeny's rescue o f Benito Mussolini), a prisoner of war (POW) camp (the Ranger rai d on Cabanatuan and the U.S. Special Forces raid on Son Tay), or a hijacked airliner (the German antiterrorist unit [GSG-9] hostag e rescue in Mogadishu). These fortified positions reflect situati ons involving defensive warfare on the part of the enemy. Carl v on Clausewitz, in his book On War, noted, The defensive form of w arfare is intrinsically stronger than the offense. [It] contribut es resisting power, the ability to preserve and protect oneself. Thus, the defense generally has a negative aim, that of resisting the enemy's will ... if we are to mount an offensive to impose o ur will, we must develop enough force to overcome the inherent su periority of the enemy's defense.2 Clausewitz's theory of war sta tes that to defeat the stronger form of warfare an army's best we apon is superior numbers. In this sense superiority of numbers ad mittedly is the most important factor in the outcome of an engage ment, so long as it is great enough to counterbalance all other c ontributing circumstances. It thus follows that as many troops as possible should be brought into the engagement at the decisive p oint. No soldier would argue the benefit of superior numbers, bu t if they were the most important factor, how could 69 German com mandos have defeated a Belgian force of 650 soldiers protected by the largest, most extensive fortress of its time, the fort at Eb en Emael? How can a special operations force that has inferior nu mbers and the disadvantage of attacking the stronger form of warf are gain superiority over the enemy? To understand this paradox i s to understand special operations. RELATIVE SUPERIORITY Relati ve superiority is a concept crucial to the theory of special oper ations. Simply stated, relative superiority is a condition that e xists when an attacking force, generally smaller, gains a decisiv e advantage over a larger or well-defended enemy. The value of th e concept of relative superiority lies in its ability to illustra te which positive forces influence the success of a mission and t o show how the frictions of war affect the achievement of the goa l. This section will define the three basic properties of relativ e superiority and describe how those properties are revealed in c ombat. Relative superiority is achieved at the pivotal moment in an engagement. For example, in World War II, when the Germans at tacked the Belgian fort at Eben Emael, they achieved a decisive a dvantage--relative superiority--over the enemy within five minute s of the initial engagement by using gliders and shaped charges t o gain surprise and speed to subdue the enemy quickly. Although t he Belgians fought for another twenty-four hours, the battle hing ed on the first few moments, and the outcome of the engagement wa s virtually assured. In some cases, the pivotal moment comes bef ore actual combat. In 1943 the British modified an old destroyer, the HMS Campbeltown, filled it with four and a quarter tons of e xplosives, covered it with armor plating, sailed it across the En glish Channel, and rammed it into the German-held dry dock at Sai nt-Nazaire, France. This action rendered the dry dock useless for the remainder of the war. Although the German defenses surroundi ng Saint-Nazaire were the heaviest in the Atlantic, once the HMS Campbeltown managed to reach the outer harbor of the port (two mi les from the dry dock), the Germans could not stop her. At this p oint, which was prior to actual hostilities, relative superiority was achieved. The point at which relative superiority is achieve d is also frequently the point of greatest risk. The closer the a ttacking force gets, the tougher the defenses become. However, on ce you overcome the last obstacle the probability of success stro ngly outweighs the probability of failure, and relative superiori ty is achieved. Once relative superiority is achieved, it must b e sustained in order to guarantee victory. In an effort to rescue the Italian dictator Benito Mussolini, SS Capt. Otto Skorzeny co nducted a glider assault on an Italian stronghold on top of Gran Sasso peak in the Apennines Mountains. Within four minutes of lan ding, Skorzeny had stormed the hotel hideout and had Mussolini in his custody. At this point he had achieved relative superiority. However, for the mission to be successful, Skorzeny had to extra ct Mussolini from the mountaintop and ensure the dictator's safe return to Rome. This interim period between grabbing Mussolini an d mission completion required sustaining relative superiority. Th is was accomplished through boldness on Skorzeny's part and by re inforcing the small commando force with conventional troops. The ability to sustain relative superiority frequently requires the intervention of courage, intellect, boldness, and perseverance, o r what Clausewitz calls the moral factors. For example, during Wo rld War II, Lt. Luigi Durand de la Penne, an Italian frogman, cla ndestinely entered Alexandria Harbor aboard a manned torpedo. He and his second diver overcame an antisubmarine net, depth charges , picketboats, pier security, and an antitorpedo net to reach the British battleship HMS Valiant. All they had to do was place exp losives on the hull and the mission would have been successful. U nfortunately, as Durand de la Penne dove the manned torpedo under the HMS Valiant, the submersible gained ballast and sank into th e mud. To make matters worse, his second diver lost consciousness and floated to the surface. Although physically exhausted from t he long dive and freezing from the cold water seeping into his to rn dry suit, Durand de la Penne spent the next forty minutes movi ng the torpedo into position under the HMS Valiant. Only through his tremendous perseverance and courage (two of the four moral fa ctors) was he able to sustain relative superiority and complete t he mission. .
Von Händler/Antiquariat, bookexpress.co.nz.
Presidio Press. Very Good. 5.99(w) x 8.95(h) x 0.90(d). Paperback. 1996. 432 pages. Vice Adm. William H. McRaven helped to devise the strategy for how to bring down Osama bin Laden, and commanded the courageous U.S. military unit that carried it out on May 1, 2011 , ending one of the greatest manhunts in history. In Spec Ops, a well-organized and deeply researched study, McRaven analyzes eigh t classic special operations. Six are from WWII: the German comma ndo raid on the Belgian fort Eben Emael (1940); the Italian torpe do attack on the Alexandria harbor (1941); the British commando r aid on Nazaire, France (1942); the German glider rescue of Benito Mussolini (1943); the British midget-submarine attack on the Tir pitz (1943); and the U.S. Ranger rescue mission at the Cabanatuan POW camp in the Philippines (1945). The two post-WWII examples a re the U.S. Army raid on the Son Tay POW camp in North Vietnam (1 970) and the Israeli rescue of the skyjacked hostages in Entebbe, Uganda (1976). McRaven--who commands a U.S. Navy SEAL team--pinp oints six essential principles of spec ops success: simplicity, s ecurity, repetition, surprise, speed and purpose. For each of the case studies, he provides political and military context, a meti culous reconstruction of the mission itself and an analysis of th e operation in relation to his six principles. McRaven deems the Son Tay raid the best modern example of a successful spec op [whi ch] should be considered textbook material for future missions. H is own book is an instructive textbook that will be closely studi ed by students of the military arts. Maps, photos. Editorial Rev iews About the Author Admiral William H. McRaven (U.S. Navy Reti red) served with great distinction in the Navy. In his thirty-sev en years as a Navy SEAL, he commanded at every level. As a Four-S tar Admiral, his final assignment was as Commander of all U.S. Sp ecial Operations Forces. He is now Chancellor of the University o f Texas System. Excerpt. Reprinted by permission. All rights re served. Theory of Special Operations In the realm of military li terature, there is much written on theory of war, ranging from He rman Kahn's thinking about the unthinkable on the nuclear end of the spectrum to B. H. Liddell Hart's indirect warfare on the conv entional end. There are theories of war escalation and war termin ation, theories of revolution and counterrevolution, and theories of insurgency and counterinsurgency. There are general airpower and sea power theories, and more specific theories on strategic b ombing and amphibious warfare. Nowhere, however, is there a theor y of special operations. Why is a theory of special operations i mportant? A successful special operation defies conventional wisd om by using a small force to defeat a much larger or well-entrenc hed opponent. This book develops a theory of special operations t hat explains why this phenomenon occurs. I will show that through the use of certain principles of warfare a special operations fo rce can reduce what Carl von Clausewitz calls the frictions of wa r to a manageable level. By minimizing these frictions the specia l operations force can achieve relative superiority over the enem y. Once relative superiority is achieved, the attacking force is no longer at a disadvantage and has the initiative to exploit the enemy's weaknesses and secure victory. Although gaining relative superiority doesn't guarantee success, it is necessary for succe ss. If we can determine, prior to an operation, the best way to a chieve relative superiority, then we can tailor special operation s planning and preparation to improve our chances of victory. Thi s theory will not make the reader a better diver, flyer, or jumpe r, but it will provide an intellectual framework for thinking abo ut special operations. The relative superiority graph that will b e shown later is a tool to assess the viability of a proposed spe cial operation. THE SCOPE OF THIS STUDY To develop a theory of special operations I had to first limit the scope of the problem. This required developing the following refined definition of a s pecial operation: A special operation is conducted by forces spec ially trained, equipped, and supported for a specific target whos e destruction, elimination, or rescue (in the case of hostages), is a political or military imperative.* My definition is not con sistent with official joint doctrine which broadly defines specia l operations to include psychological operations, civil affairs, and reconnaissance. The eight combat operations I analyzed to det ermine the principles of special operations and to develop the th eory are more closely aligned to what Joint Pub 3-05 defines as a direct-action mission.†Unlike direct-action missions, however, the eight special operations that I analyze in this book were alw ays of a strategic or operational nature and had the advantage of virtually unlimited resources and national-level intelligence. T he refined definition also implies that special operations can be conducted by non-special operations personnel, such as those air men who conducted James Doolittle's raid on Tokyo or the submarin ers involved in the raid on the German battleship Tirpitz. Althou gh I believe the theory of special operations, as presented in th is book, is applicable across the spectrum of special operations, as defined by Joint Pub 3-05, it was developed solely from the e ight case studies presented in this work. All usage of the term s pecial operations henceforth will adhere to this refined definiti on. WHY ARE SPECIAL OPERATIONS UNIQUE? All special operations a re conducted against fortified positions, whether a particular po sition is a battleship surrounded by anti-torpedo nets (the Briti sh midget submarine raid on the German battleship Tirpitz), a mou ntain retreat guarded by Italian troops (Otto Skorzeny's rescue o f Benito Mussolini), a prisoner of war (POW) camp (the Ranger rai d on Cabanatuan and the U.S. Special Forces raid on Son Tay), or a hijacked airliner (the German antiterrorist unit [GSG-9] hostag e rescue in Mogadishu). These fortified positions reflect situati ons involving defensive warfare on the part of the enemy. Carl v on Clausewitz, in his book On War, noted, The defensive form of w arfare is intrinsically stronger than the offense. [It] contribut es resisting power, the ability to preserve and protect oneself. Thus, the defense generally has a negative aim, that of resisting the enemy's will ... if we are to mount an offensive to impose o ur will, we must develop enough force to overcome the inherent su periority of the enemy's defense.2 Clausewitz's theory of war sta tes that to defeat the stronger form of warfare an army's best we apon is superior numbers. In this sense superiority of numbers ad mittedly is the most important factor in the outcome of an engage ment, so long as it is great enough to counterbalance all other c ontributing circumstances. It thus follows that as many troops as possible should be brought into the engagement at the decisive p oint. No soldier would argue the benefit of superior numbers, bu t if they were the most important factor, how could 69 German com mandos have defeated a Belgian force of 650 soldiers protected by the largest, most extensive fortress of its time, the fort at Eb en Emael? How can a special operations force that has inferior nu mbers and the disadvantage of attacking the stronger form of warf are gain superiority over the enemy? To understand this paradox i s to understand special operations. RELATIVE SUPERIORITY Relati ve superiority is a concept crucial to the theory of special oper ations. Simply stated, relative superiority is a condition that e xists when an attacking force, generally smaller, gains a decisiv e advantage over a larger or well-defended enemy. The value of th e concept of relative superiority lies in its ability to illustra te which positive forces influence the success of a mission and t o show how the frictions of war affect the achievement of the goa l. This section will define the three basic properties of relativ e superiority and describe how those properties are revealed in c ombat. Relative superiority is achieved at the pivotal moment in an engagement. For example, in World War II, when the Germans at tacked the Belgian fort at Eben Emael, they achieved a decisive a dvantage--relative superiority--over the enemy within five minute s of the initial engagement by using gliders and shaped charges t o gain surprise and speed to subdue the enemy quickly. Although t he Belgians fought for another twenty-four hours, the battle hing ed on the first few moments, and the outcome of the engagement wa s virtually assured. In some cases, the pivotal moment comes bef ore actual combat. In 1943 the British modified an old destroyer, the HMS Campbeltown, filled it with four and a quarter tons of e xplosives, covered it with armor plating, sailed it across the En glish Channel, and rammed it into the German-held dry dock at Sai nt-Nazaire, France. This action rendered the dry dock useless for the remainder of the war. Although the German defenses surroundi ng Saint-Nazaire were the heaviest in the Atlantic, once the HMS Campbeltown managed to reach the outer harbor of the port (two mi les from the dry dock), the Germans could not stop her. At this p oint, which was prior to actual hostilities, relative superiority was achieved. The point at which relative superiority is achieve d is also frequently the point of greatest risk. The closer the a ttacking force gets, the tougher the defenses become. However, on ce you overcome the last obstacle the probability of success stro ngly outweighs the probability of failure, and relative superiori ty is achieved. Once relative superiority is achieved, it must b e sustained in order to guarantee victory. In an effort to rescue the Italian dictator Benito Mussolini, SS Capt. Otto Skorzeny co nducted a glider assault on an Italian stronghold on top of Gran Sasso peak in the Apennines Mountains. Within four minutes of lan ding, Skorzeny had stormed the hotel hideout and had Mussolini in his custody. At this point he had achieved relative superiority. However, for the mission to be successful, Skorzeny had to extra ct Mussolini from the mountaintop and ensure the dictator's safe return to Rome. This interim period between grabbing Mussolini an d mission completion required sustaining relative superiority. Th is was accomplished through boldness on Skorzeny's part and by re inforcing the small commando force with conventional troops. The ability to sustain relative superiority frequently requires the intervention of courage, intellect, boldness, and perseverance, o r what Clausewitz calls the moral factors. For example, during Wo rld War II, Lt. Luigi Durand de la Penne, an Italian frogman, cla ndestinely entered Alexandria Harbor aboard a manned torpedo. He and his second diver overcame an antisubmarine net, depth charges , picketboats, pier security, and an antitorpedo net to reach the British battleship HMS Valiant. All they had to do was place exp losives on the hull and the mission would have been successful. U nfortunately, as Durand de la Penne dove the manned torpedo under the HMS Valiant, the submersible gained ballast and sank into th e mud. To make matters worse, his second diver lost consciousness and floated to the surface. Although physically exhausted from t he long dive and freezing from the cold water seeping into his to rn dry suit, Durand de la Penne spent the next forty minutes movi ng the torpedo into position under the HMS Valiant. Only through his tremendous perseverance and courage (two of the four moral fa ctors) was he able to sustain relative superiority and complete t he mission. .
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Spec Ops (2009)
~EN NW EB DLISBN: 9780307547231 bzw. 030754723X, vermutlich in Englisch, Presidio Press, Presidio Press, Presidio Press, neu, E-Book, elektronischer Download.
Lieferung aus: Frankreich, in-stock.
Vice Adm. William H. McRaven helped to devise the strategy for how to bring down Osama bin Laden, and commanded the courageous U.S. military unit that carried it out on May 1, 2011, ending one of the greatest manhunts in history. In Spec Ops,.
Vice Adm. William H. McRaven helped to devise the strategy for how to bring down Osama bin Laden, and commanded the courageous U.S. military unit that carried it out on May 1, 2011, ending one of the greatest manhunts in history. In Spec Ops,.
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Spec Ops: Case Studies in Special Operations Warfare: Theory and Practice (1996)
EN PB NWISBN: 9780891416005 bzw. 0891416005, in Englisch, Presidio Press, Taschenbuch, neu.
Lieferung aus: Schweiz, Versandfertig innert 1-2 Werktagen.
Case Studies in Special Operations Warfare: Theory and Practice, Bill McRaven, commander of a team of SEALs, the Navy´s elite special operations force, is an expert on the subject of special operations. ´´In this well-organized and deeply researched study, McRaven pinpoints six essential principles of ´spec ops´ success: simplicity, security, repetition, surprise, speed, and purpose´´.--Publishers Weekly. Photos. Notes. Index. Maps & graphs. Taschenbuch, 01.06.1996.
Case Studies in Special Operations Warfare: Theory and Practice, Bill McRaven, commander of a team of SEALs, the Navy´s elite special operations force, is an expert on the subject of special operations. ´´In this well-organized and deeply researched study, McRaven pinpoints six essential principles of ´spec ops´ success: simplicity, security, repetition, surprise, speed, and purpose´´.--Publishers Weekly. Photos. Notes. Index. Maps & graphs. Taschenbuch, 01.06.1996.
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Spec Ops als eBook Download von
EN NW EBISBN: 9780307547231 bzw. 030754723X, in Englisch, Random House Publishing Group, neu, E-Book.
Spec Ops:Case Studies in Special Operations Warfare: Theory and Practice Presidio Press William H. Mcraven Spec Ops:Case Studies in Special Operations Warfare: Theory and Practice Presidio Press William H. Mcraven.
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