J: Rule-Following Paradox and its Implications - 13 Angebote vergleichen

Lieferung aus: Schweiz, Versandfertig innert 4 - 7 Werktagen.
This monograph presents Azzouni’s new approach to the rule-following paradox. His solution leaves intact an isolated individual’s capacity to follow rules, and it simultaneously avoids replacing the truth conditions for meaning-talk with mere assertability conditions for that talk.  Kripke’s influential version of Wittgenstein’s rule-following paradox—and Wittgenstein’s views more generally—on the contrary, make rule-following practices and assertions about those practices subject to community norms without which they lose their cogency. Azzouni summarizes and develops Kripke’s original version of Wittgenstein’s rule-following paradox to make salient the linchpin assumptions of the paradox. By doing so, Azzouni reveals how compelling Kripke’s earlier work on the paradox was. Objections raised over the years by Fodor, Forbes Ginsborg, Goldfarb, Tait, Wright, and many others, are all shown to fail. No straight solution (a solution that denies an assumption of the paradox) can be made to work. Azzouni illustrates this in detail by showing that a popular family of straight solutions due to Lewis and refined by Williams, “reference magnetism,” fail as well.  And yet an overlooked sceptical solution is still available in logical space. Azzouni describes a series of “disposition-meaning” private languages that he shows can be successfully used by a population of speakers to communicate with one another despite their ideolectical character. The same sorts of languages enable solitary “Robinson Crusoes” to survive and flourish in their island habitats. These languages—sufficiently refined—have the same properties normal human languages have; and this is the key to solving the rule-following paradox without sacrificing the individual’s authority over her self-imposed rules or her ability to follow those rules.  Azzouni concludes this unusual monograph by uncovering a striking resemblance between the rule-following paradox and Hume’s problem of induction: he shows the rule-following paradox to be a corollary of Hume’s problem that arises when the problem of induction is applied to an individual’s own abilities to follow rules. “The book is clearly and engagingly written, and the conclusions are well-argued-for. (Depressingly well-argued-for in the case of Chapter 3, as I've always been partial to Lewisian responses to Putnam's model-theoretic argument--I'm rethinking that now.) And the proposed solution to the rule-following paradox really is novel.” Joshua Brown  - Gustavus Adolphus College, Taschenbuch, 04.09.2017.

Lieferung aus: Deutschland, Sofort lieferbar.
This monograph presents Azzouni’s new approach to the rule-following paradox. His solution leaves intact an isolated individual’s capacity to follow rules, and it simultaneously avoids replacing the truth conditions for meaning-talk with mere assertability conditions for that talk.  Kripke’s influential version of Wittgenstein’s rule-following paradox—and Wittgenstein’s views more generally—on the contrary, make rule-following practices and assertions about those practices subject to community norms without which they lose their cogency. Azzouni summarizes and develops Kripke’s original version of Wittgenstein’s rule-following paradox to make salient the linchpin assumptions of the paradox. By doing so, Azzouni reveals how compelling Kripke’s earlier work on the paradox was. Objections raised over the years by Fodor, Forbes Ginsborg, Goldfarb, Tait, Wright, and many others, are all shown to fail. No straight solution (a solution that denies an assumption of the paradox) can be made to work. Azzouni illustrates this in detail by showing that a popular family of straight solutions due to Lewis and refined by Williams, “reference magnetism,” fail as well.  And yet an overlooked sceptical solution is still available in logical space. Azzouni describes a series of “disposition-meaning” private languages that he shows can be successfully used by a population of speakers to communicate with one another despite their ideolectical character. The same sorts of languages enable solitary “Robinson Crusoes” to survive and flourish in their island habitats. These languages—sufficiently refined—have the same properties normal human languages have; and this is the key to solving the rule-following paradox without sacrificing the individual’s authority over her self-imposed rules or her ability to follow those rules.  Azzouni concludes this unusual monograph by uncovering a striking resemblance between the rule-following paradox and Hume’s problem of induction: he shows the rule-following paradox to be a corollary of Hume’s problem that arises when the problem of induction is applied to an individual’s own abilities to follow rules. “The book is clearly and engagingly written, and the conclusions are well-argued-for. (Depressingly well-argued-for in the case of Chapter 3, as I've always been partial to Lewisian responses to Putnam's model-theoretic argument--I'm rethinking that now.) And the proposed solution to the rule-following paradox really is novel.” Joshua Brown  - Gustavus Adolphus College, gebundene Ausgabe, 16.03.2017.

Lieferung aus: Schweiz, Lagernd, zzgl. Versandkosten.
This monograph presents Azzouni’s new approach to the rule-following paradox. His solution leaves intact an isolated individual’s capacity to follow rules, and it simultaneously avoids replacing the truth conditions for meaning-talk with mere assertability conditions for that talk. Kripke’s influential version of Wittgenstein’s rule-following paradox—and Wittgenstein’s views more generally—on the contrary, make rule-following practices and assertions about those practices subject to community norms without which they lose their cogency. Azzouni summarizes and develops Kripke’s original version of Wittgenstein’s rule-following paradox to make salient the linchpin assumptions of the paradox. By doing so, Azzouni reveals how compelling Kripke’s earlier work on the paradox was. Objections raised over the years by Fodor, Forbes Ginsborg, Goldfarb, Tait, Wright, and many others, are all shown to fail. No straight solution (a solution that denies an assumption of the paradox) can be made to work. Azzouni illustrates this in detail by showing that a popular family of straight solutions due to Lewis and refined by Williams, “reference magnetism,” fail as well. And yet an overlooked sceptical solution is still available in logical space. Azzouni describes a series of “disposition-meaning” private languages that he shows can be successfully used by a population of speakers to communicate with one another despite their ideolectical character. The same sorts of languages enable solitary “Robinson Crusoes” to survive and flourish in their island habitats. These languages—sufficiently refined—have the same properties normal human languages have; and this is the key to solving the rule-following paradox without sacrificing the individual’s authority over her self-imposed rules or her ability to follow those rules. Azzouni concludes this unusual monograph by uncovering a striking resemblance between the rule-following paradox and Hume’s problem of induction: he shows the rule-following paradox to be a corollary of Hume’s problem that arises when the problem of induction is applied to an individual’s own abilities to follow rules. “The book is clearly and engagingly written, and the conclusions are well-argued-for. (Depressingly well-argued-for in the case of Chapter 3, as I've always been partial to Lewisian responses to Putnam's model-theoretic argument--I'm rethinking that now.) And the proposed solution to the rule-following paradox really is novel.” Joshua Brown - Gustavus Adolphus College, Soft cover.

Lieferung aus: Vereinigte Staaten von Amerika, Lagernd, zzgl. Versandkosten.
This monograph presents Azzouni’s new approach to the rule-following paradox. His solution leaves intact an isolated individual’s capacity to follow rules, and it simultaneously avoids replacing the truth conditions for meaning-talk with mere assertability conditions for that talk. Kripke’s influential version of Wittgenstein’s rule-following paradox—and Wittgenstein’s views more generally—on the contrary, make rule-following practices and assertions about those practices subject to community norms without which they lose their cogency. Azzouni summarizes and develops Kripke’s original version of Wittgenstein’s rule-following paradox to make salient the linchpin assumptions of the paradox. By doing so, Azzouni reveals how compelling Kripke’s earlier work on the paradox was. Objections raised over the years by Fodor, Forbes Ginsborg, Goldfarb, Tait, Wright, and many others, are all shown to fail. No straight solution (a solution that denies an assumption of the paradox) can be made to work. Azzouni illustrates this in detail by showing that a popular family of straight solutions due to Lewis and refined by Williams, “reference magnetism,” fail as well. And yet an overlooked sceptical solution is still available in logical space. Azzouni describes a series of “disposition-meaning” private languages that he shows can be successfully used by a population of speakers to communicate with one another despite their ideolectical character. The same sorts of languages enable solitary “Robinson Crusoes” to survive and flourish in their island habitats. These languages—sufficiently refined—have the same properties normal human languages have; and this is the key to solving the rule-following paradox without sacrificing the individual’s authority over her self-imposed rules or her ability to follow those rules. Azzouni concludes this unusual monograph by uncovering a striking resemblance between the rule-following paradox and Hume’s problem of induction: he shows the rule-following paradox to be a corollary of Hume’s problem that arises when the problem of induction is applied to an individual’s own abilities to follow rules.“The book is clearly and engagingly written, and the conclusions are well-argued-for. (Depressingly well-argued-for in the case of Chapter 3, as I've always been partial to Lewisian responses to Putnam's model-theoretic argument--I'm rethinking that now.) And the proposed solution to the rule-following paradox really is novel.” Joshua Brown - Gustavus Adolphus College.

Lieferung aus: Kanada, Lagernd, zzgl. Versandkosten.
This monograph presents Azzouni''s new approach to the rule-following paradox. His solution leaves intact an isolated individual''s capacity to follow rules, and it simultaneously avoids replacing the truth conditions for meaning-talk with mere assertability conditions for that talk. Kripke''s influential version of Wittgenstein''s rule-following paradox-and Wittgenstein''s views more generally-on the contrary, make rule-following practices and assertions about those practices subject to community norms without which they lose their cogency.Azzouni summarizes and develops Kripke''s original version of Wittgenstein''s rule-following paradox to make salient the linchpin assumptions of the paradox. By doing so, Azzouni reveals how compelling Kripke''s earlier work on the paradox was. Objections raised over the years by Fodor, Forbes Ginsborg, Goldfarb, Tait, Wright, and many others, are all shown to fail. No straight solution (a solution that denies an assumption of theparadox) can be made to work. Azzouni illustrates this in detail by showing that a popular family of straight solutions due to Lewis and refined by Williams, "reference magnetism," fail as well. And yet an overlooked sceptical solution is still available in logical space. Azzouni describes a series of "disposition-meaning" private languages that he shows can be successfully used by a population of speakers to communicate with one another despite their ideolectical character. The same sorts of languages enable solitary "Robinson Crusoes" to survive and flourish in their island habitats. These languages-sufficiently refined-have the same properties normal human languages have; and this is the key to solving the rule-following paradox without sacrificing the individual''s authority over her self-imposed rules or her ability to follow those rules. Azzouni concludes this unusual monograph by uncovering a striking resemblance between the rule-following paradox andHume''s problem of induction: he shows the rule-following paradox to be a corollary of Hume''s problem that arises when the problem of induction is applied to an individual''s own abilities to follow rules. "The book is clearly and engagingly written, and the conclusions are well-argued-for. (Depressingly well-argued-for in the case of Chapter 3, as I''ve always been partial to Lewisian responses to Putnam''s model-theoretic argument--I''m rethinking that now.) And the proposed solution to the rule-following paradox really is novel."Joshua Brown  - Gustavus Adolphus College.

Lieferung aus: Vereinigte Staaten von Amerika, Not yet published.
Von Händler/Antiquariat, Amazon.com.
This monograph presents a new approach to the rule-following paradox, one that doesn’t favor community standards over individual ones. This approach also doesn’t replace truth conditions with assertability conditions.The author is concerned with how Kripke’s influential version of Wittgenstein’s rule-following paradox―and Wittgenstein’s views more generally―have been perceived as undercutting the belief that individuals can, entirely independently of a community, engage in cogent mathematics and indeed have “private languages.”The book first summarizes and develops Kripke’s original version of Wittgenstein’s rule-following paradox. It then goes on to describe a disposition-meaning language as well as shows how individuals (also known as Robinson Crusoes) can utilize such a language privately. Next, coverage explores why reference magnetism approaches to the rule-following paradox (and to Putnam’s paradox as well) don’t work, examines how positive success curves enable private rule following, and offers a skeptical solution that is completely compatible with truth conditions and truth-conditional semantics.The author shows that the rule-following paradox is deep in the sense that genuinely solving it has important corollaries for semantic theories of our language as well as for metaphysics, more generally. He also suggests that the relationship between the rule-following problem and Hume’s problem of induction may be closer than anyone has realized., Hardcover, الطبعة: 2017 ed. التسمية: Springer, Springer, مجموعة المنتجات: Book, ونشرت: 2017-04-05, ستوديو: Springer.

Lieferung aus: Vereinigtes Königreich Großbritannien und Nordirland, in-stock.
This monograph presents Azzouni s new approach to the rule-following paradox. His solution leaves intact an isolated individual s capacity to follow rules, and it simultaneously avoids replacing the truth conditions for meaning-talk with mere assertability conditions for that talk. Kripke s influential version of Wittgenstein s rule-following paradox and Wittgenstein s views more generally on the contrary, make rule-following practices and assertions about those practices subject to community norms without which they lose their cogency. Azzouni summarizes and develops Kripke s original version of Wittgenstein s rule-following paradox to make salient the linchpin assumptions of the paradox. By doing so, Azzouni reveals how compelling Kripke s earlier work on the paradox was. Objections raised over the years by Fodor, Forbes Ginsborg, Goldfarb, Tait, Wright, and many others, are all shown to fail. No straight solution (a solution that denies an assumption of the paradox) can be made to work. Azzouni illustrates this in detail by showing that a popular family of straight solutions due to Lewis and refined by Williams, reference magnetism, fail as well. And yet an overlooked sceptical solution is still available in logical space. Azzouni describes a series of disposition-meaning private languages that he shows can be successfully used by a population of speakers to communicate with one another despite their ideolectical character. The same sorts of languages enable solitary Robinson Crusoes to survive and flourish in their island habitats. These languages sufficiently refined have the same properties normal human languages have; and this is the key to solving the rule-following paradox without sacrificing the individual s authority over her self-imposed rules or her ability to follow those rules. Azzouni concludes this unusual monograph by uncovering a striking resemblance between the rule-following paradox A.

The Rule-Following Paradox and its Implications for Metaphysics: This monograph presents a new approach to the rule-following paradox, one that doesn`t favor community standards over individual ones. This approach also doesn`t replace truth conditions with assertability conditions. The author is concerned with how Kripke`s influential version of Wittgenstein`s rule-following paradox-and Wittgenstein`s views more generally-have been perceived as undercutting the belief that individuals can, entirely independently of a community, engage in cogent mathematics and indeed have `private languages.` The book first summarizes and develops Kripke`s original version of Wittgenstein`s rule-following paradox. It then goes on to describe a disposition-meaning language as well as shows how individuals (also known as Robinson Crusoes) can utilize such a language privately. Next, coverage explores why reference magnetism approaches to the rule-following paradox (and to Putnam`s paradox as well) don`t work, examines how positive success curves enable private rule following, and offers a skeptical solution that is completely compatible with truth conditions and truth-conditional semantics. The author shows that the rule-following paradox is deep in the sense that genuinely solving it has important corollaries for semantic theories of our language as well as for metaphysics, more generally. He also suggests that the relationship between the rule-following problem and Hume`s problem of induction may be closer than anyone has realized. Englisch, Buch.

Lieferung aus: Deutschland, Versandkostenfrei innerhalb von Deutschland.
This monograph presents Azzouni´s new approach to the rule-following paradox. His solution leaves intact an isolated individual´s capacity to follow rules, and it simultaneously avoids replacing the truth conditions for meaning-talk with mere assertability conditions for that talk. Kripke´s influential version of Wittgenstein´s rule-following paradox-and Wittgenstein´s views more generally-on the contrary, make rule-following practices and assertions about those practices subject to community This monograph presents Azzouni´s new approach to the rule-following paradox. His solution leaves intact an isolated individual´s capacity to follow rules, and it simultaneously avoids replacing the truth conditions for meaning-talk with mere assertability conditions for that talk. Kripke´s influential version of Wittgenstein´s rule-following paradox-and Wittgenstein´s views more generally-on the contrary, make rule-following practices and assertions about those practices subject to community norms without which they lose their cogency. Azzouni summarizes and develops Kripke´s original version of Wittgenstein´s rule-following paradox to make salient the linchpin assumptions of the paradox. By doing so, Azzouni reveals how compelling Kripke´s earlier work on the paradox was. Objections raised over the years by Fodor, Forbes Ginsborg, Goldfarb, Tait, Wright, and many others, are all shown to fail. No straight solution (a solution that denies an assumption of the paradox) can be made to work. Azzouni illustrates this in detail by showing that a popular family of straight solutions due to Lewis and refined by Williams, ´´reference magnetism,´´ fail as well. And yet an overlooked sceptical solution is still available in logical space. Azzouni describes a series of ´´disposition-meaning´´ private languages that he shows can be successfully used by a population of speakers to communicate with one another despite their ideolectical character. The same sorts of languages enable solitary ´´Robinson Crusoes´´ to survive and flourish in their island habitats. These languages-sufficiently refined-have the same properties normal human languages have; and this is the key to solving the rule-following paradox without sacrificing the individual´s authority over her self-imposed rules or her ability to follow those rules. Azzouni concludes this unusual monograph by uncovering a striking resemblance between the rule-following paradox and Hume´s problem of induction: he shows the rule-following paradox to be a corollary of Hume´s problem that arises when the problem of induction is applied to an individual´s own abilities to follow rules. Lieferzeit 1-2 Werktage.

Lieferung aus: Vereinigtes Königreich Großbritannien und Nordirland, in-stock.
This monograph presents a new approach to the rule-following paradox, one that doesn t favor community standards over individual ones. This approach also doesn t replace truth conditions with assertability conditions. The author is concerned with how Kripke s influential version of Wittgenstein s rule-following paradox and Wittgenstein s views more generally have been perceived as undercutting the belief that individuals can, entirely independently of a community, engage in cogent mathematics and indeed have private languages. The book first summarizes and develops Kripke s original version of Wittgenstein s rule-following paradox. It then goes on to describe a disposition-meaning language as well as shows how individuals (also known as Robinson Crusoes) can utilize such a language privately. Next, coverage explores why reference magnetism approaches to the rule-following paradox (and to Putnam s paradox as well) don t work, examines how positive success curves enable private rule following, and offers a skeptical solution that is completely compatible with truth conditions and truth-conditional semantics. The author shows that the rule-following paradox is deep in the sense that genuinely solving it has important corollaries for semantic theories of our language as well as for metaphysics, more generally. He also suggests that the relationship between the rule-following problem and Hume s problem of induction may be closer than anyone has realized.