Interpreting the Constitution - 5 Angebote vergleichen
Bester Preis: € 29,41 (vom 08.10.2016)1
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Interpreting the Constitution
EN HC NW
ISBN: 9780199756155 bzw. 0199756155, in Englisch, Oxford University Press, gebundenes Buch, neu.
Lieferung aus: Vereinigte Staaten von Amerika, Versandkosten nach: USA.
Von Händler/Antiquariat, ProfessionalandAcademicBookstore.
Oxford University Press. Hardcover. 0199756155 BRAND-NEW, Unread Copy in Perfect Condition. FAST FedEx shipping (you'll receive your order within 1-5 business days after shipping in most cases*), this helps to ensure your order arrives in perfect condition. PLEASE NOTE: FedEx does not generally deliver to PO Boxes or APO addresses, so please be sure to give us a physical street address to deliver to; also, unfortunately, we cannot ship this item to Alaska or Hawaii. THANKS! *(this applies to domestic shipments within the continental US - other destinations may take longer) . New.
Von Händler/Antiquariat, ProfessionalandAcademicBookstore.
Oxford University Press. Hardcover. 0199756155 BRAND-NEW, Unread Copy in Perfect Condition. FAST FedEx shipping (you'll receive your order within 1-5 business days after shipping in most cases*), this helps to ensure your order arrives in perfect condition. PLEASE NOTE: FedEx does not generally deliver to PO Boxes or APO addresses, so please be sure to give us a physical street address to deliver to; also, unfortunately, we cannot ship this item to Alaska or Hawaii. THANKS! *(this applies to domestic shipments within the continental US - other destinations may take longer) . New.
2
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Interpreting the Constitution (1865)
EN HC NW
ISBN: 9780199756155 bzw. 0199756155, in Englisch, Oxford University Press Inc, gebundenes Buch, neu.
Von Händler/Antiquariat, THE SAINT BOOKSTORE [51194787], Southport, United Kingdom.
BRAND NEW, Interpreting the Constitution, Kent Greenawalt, This third volume about legal interpretation focuses on the interpretation of a constitution, most specifically that of the United States of America. In what may be unique, it combines a generalized account of various claims and possibilities with an examination of major domains of American constitutional law. This demonstrates convincingly that the book's major themes not only can be supported by individual examples, but are undeniably in accord with the continuing practice of the United States Supreme Court over time, and cannot be dismissed as misguided. The book's central thesis is that strategies of constitutional interpretation cannot be simple, that judges must take account of multiple factors not systematically reducible to any clear ordering. For any constitution that lasts over centuries and is hard to amend, original understanding cannot be completely determinative. To discern what that is, both how informed readers grasped a provision and what were the enactors' aims matter. Indeed, distinguishing these is usually extremely difficult, and often neither is really discernible. As time passes what modern citizens understand becomes important, diminishing the significance of original understanding. Simple versions of textualist originalism neither reflect what has taken place nor is really supportable. The focus on specific provisions shows, among other things, the obstacles to discerning original understanding, and why the original sense of proper interpretation should itself carry importance. For applying the Bill of Rights to states, conceptions conceived when the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted should take priority over those in 1791. But practically, for courts, to interpret provisions differently for the federal and state governments would be highly unwise. The scope of various provisions, such as those regarding free speech and cruel and unusual punishment, have expanded hugely since both 1791 and 1865. And questions such as how much deference judges should accord the political branches depend greatly on what provisions and issues are involved. Even with respect to single provisions, such as the Free Speech Clause, interpretive approaches have sensibly varied, greatly depending on the more particular subjects involved. How much deference judges should accord political actors also depends critically on the kind of issue involved.
BRAND NEW, Interpreting the Constitution, Kent Greenawalt, This third volume about legal interpretation focuses on the interpretation of a constitution, most specifically that of the United States of America. In what may be unique, it combines a generalized account of various claims and possibilities with an examination of major domains of American constitutional law. This demonstrates convincingly that the book's major themes not only can be supported by individual examples, but are undeniably in accord with the continuing practice of the United States Supreme Court over time, and cannot be dismissed as misguided. The book's central thesis is that strategies of constitutional interpretation cannot be simple, that judges must take account of multiple factors not systematically reducible to any clear ordering. For any constitution that lasts over centuries and is hard to amend, original understanding cannot be completely determinative. To discern what that is, both how informed readers grasped a provision and what were the enactors' aims matter. Indeed, distinguishing these is usually extremely difficult, and often neither is really discernible. As time passes what modern citizens understand becomes important, diminishing the significance of original understanding. Simple versions of textualist originalism neither reflect what has taken place nor is really supportable. The focus on specific provisions shows, among other things, the obstacles to discerning original understanding, and why the original sense of proper interpretation should itself carry importance. For applying the Bill of Rights to states, conceptions conceived when the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted should take priority over those in 1791. But practically, for courts, to interpret provisions differently for the federal and state governments would be highly unwise. The scope of various provisions, such as those regarding free speech and cruel and unusual punishment, have expanded hugely since both 1791 and 1865. And questions such as how much deference judges should accord the political branches depend greatly on what provisions and issues are involved. Even with respect to single provisions, such as the Free Speech Clause, interpretive approaches have sensibly varied, greatly depending on the more particular subjects involved. How much deference judges should accord political actors also depends critically on the kind of issue involved.
3
Interpreting the Constitution (2015)
EN HC NW
ISBN: 9780199756155 bzw. 0199756155, in Englisch, Oxford University Press Inc, gebundenes Buch, neu.
Lieferung aus: Niederlande, 4-8 werkdagen.
Books2Anywhere.
This third volume about legal interpretation focuses on the interpretation of a constitution, most specifically that of the United States of America. In what may be unique, it combines a generalized account of various claims and possibilities with an examination of major domains of American constitutional law. This demonstrates convincingly that the book's major themes not only can be supported by individual examples, but are undeniably in accord with the continuing practice of the United States... This third volume about legal interpretation focuses on the interpretation of a constitution, most specifically that of the United States of America. In what may be unique, it combines a generalized account of various claims and possibilities with an examination of major domains of American constitutional law. This demonstrates convincingly that the book's major themes not only can be supported by individual examples, but are undeniably in accord with the continuing practice of the United States Supreme Court over time, and cannot be dismissed as misguided. The book's central thesis is that strategies of constitutional interpretation cannot be simple, that judges must take account of multiple factors not systematically reducible to any clear ordering. For any constitution that lasts over centuries and is hard to amend, original understanding cannot be completely determinative. To discern what that is, both how informed readers grasped a provision and what were the enactors' aims matter. Indeed, distinguishing these is usually extremely difficult, and often neither is really discernible. As time passes what modern citizens understand becomes important, diminishing the significance of original understanding. Simple versions of textualist originalism neither reflect what has taken place nor is really supportable. The focus on specific provisions shows, among other things, the obstacles to discerning original understanding, and why the original sense of proper interpretation should itself carry importance. For applying the Bill of Rights to states, conceptions conceived when the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted should take priority over those in 1791. But practically, for courts, to interpret provisions differently for the federal and state governments would be highly unwise. The scope of various provisions, such as those regarding free speech and cruel and unusual punishment, have expanded hugely since both 1791 and 1865. And questions such as how much deference judges should accord the political branches depend greatly on what provisions and issues are involved. Even with respect to single provisions, such as the Free Speech Clause, interpretive approaches have sensibly varied, greatly depending on the more particular subjects involved. How much deference judges should accord political actors also depends critically on the kind of issue involved.Taal: Engels;Afmetingen: 38x238x167 mm;Gewicht: 862,00 gram;Verschijningsdatum: november 2015;Druk: 1;ISBN10: 0199756155;ISBN13: 9780199756155; Engelstalig | Hardcover | 2015.
Books2Anywhere.
This third volume about legal interpretation focuses on the interpretation of a constitution, most specifically that of the United States of America. In what may be unique, it combines a generalized account of various claims and possibilities with an examination of major domains of American constitutional law. This demonstrates convincingly that the book's major themes not only can be supported by individual examples, but are undeniably in accord with the continuing practice of the United States... This third volume about legal interpretation focuses on the interpretation of a constitution, most specifically that of the United States of America. In what may be unique, it combines a generalized account of various claims and possibilities with an examination of major domains of American constitutional law. This demonstrates convincingly that the book's major themes not only can be supported by individual examples, but are undeniably in accord with the continuing practice of the United States Supreme Court over time, and cannot be dismissed as misguided. The book's central thesis is that strategies of constitutional interpretation cannot be simple, that judges must take account of multiple factors not systematically reducible to any clear ordering. For any constitution that lasts over centuries and is hard to amend, original understanding cannot be completely determinative. To discern what that is, both how informed readers grasped a provision and what were the enactors' aims matter. Indeed, distinguishing these is usually extremely difficult, and often neither is really discernible. As time passes what modern citizens understand becomes important, diminishing the significance of original understanding. Simple versions of textualist originalism neither reflect what has taken place nor is really supportable. The focus on specific provisions shows, among other things, the obstacles to discerning original understanding, and why the original sense of proper interpretation should itself carry importance. For applying the Bill of Rights to states, conceptions conceived when the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted should take priority over those in 1791. But practically, for courts, to interpret provisions differently for the federal and state governments would be highly unwise. The scope of various provisions, such as those regarding free speech and cruel and unusual punishment, have expanded hugely since both 1791 and 1865. And questions such as how much deference judges should accord the political branches depend greatly on what provisions and issues are involved. Even with respect to single provisions, such as the Free Speech Clause, interpretive approaches have sensibly varied, greatly depending on the more particular subjects involved. How much deference judges should accord political actors also depends critically on the kind of issue involved.Taal: Engels;Afmetingen: 38x238x167 mm;Gewicht: 862,00 gram;Verschijningsdatum: november 2015;Druk: 1;ISBN10: 0199756155;ISBN13: 9780199756155; Engelstalig | Hardcover | 2015.
4
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Interpreting the Constitution (2015)
EN HC US
ISBN: 9780199756155 bzw. 0199756155, in Englisch, Oxford University Press, gebundenes Buch, gebraucht.
Lieferung aus: Vereinigte Staaten von Amerika, Versandkosten nach: USA.
Von Händler/Antiquariat, BooksEntirely.
Oxford University Press, 2015-11-04. Hardcover. Good.
Von Händler/Antiquariat, BooksEntirely.
Oxford University Press, 2015-11-04. Hardcover. Good.
5
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Constitutional Interpretation (2015)
EN HC NW
ISBN: 9780199756155 bzw. 0199756155, in Englisch, OUP USA, gebundenes Buch, neu.
Lieferung aus: Vereinigtes Königreich Großbritannien und Nordirland, zzgl. Versandkosten, Verandgebiet: EUR.
Von Händler/Antiquariat, AwesomeBooksUK, OXON, PO BOX 318, [RE:5].
Hardcover.
Von Händler/Antiquariat, AwesomeBooksUK, OXON, PO BOX 318, [RE:5].
Hardcover.
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